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PROPERTY, LIBERTY, AND THE RIGHTS OF
THE COMMUNITY: LESSONS FROM
MUNN V. ILLINOIS
PAUL KENSt
ABSTRACT
When considering the extent to which the United States
Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business,
today's historians and constitutional theorists treat the question as
a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against
government power. Moreover, modem scholars commonly
maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant
tradition in constitutional history. Tracing it back to the tenants of
Jacksonian democracy that emphasized distrust of government,
they imply that constitutional history has developed as a straight
line: always with an emphasis on individual liberty and always
with a presumption that entrepreneurial liberty should be favored
over governments' power to regulate.
This paper will use the 1877 case Munn v. Illinois to
demonstrate that prior to the late 1880s the paradigm for
determining the constitution's limits on government regulation of
business was actually quite different. There is no doubt that the
Court has always emphatically recognized the importance of
property rights. Nevertheless, during the first century under the
Constitution, it treated business regulation as a matter of balancing
entrepreneurial liberty against the rights of the community.
Furthermore, it consistently held that, because state economic
regulations were an expression of popular sovereignty and rights of
the community, they should be presumed to be valid.
Munn is significant because in the conventional narrative it
is portrayed as a steppingstone in the straight line evolution of
constitutional doctrine that emphasizes individual liberty. A closer
look at the case and the events surrounding it will demonstrate,
however, that the majority in Munn actually based its opinion on
the traditional emphasis on rights of the community. It will further
Professor ofPolitical Science and History, Texas State University-San Marcos.
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demonstrate that for more than a decade after the opinion the
Supreme Court steadfastly clung to that traditional view. Even
under persistent pressure to change.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When considering the extent to which the United States
Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business,
today's historians and constitutional theorists treat the question as
a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against
government power. Moreover, modern scholars commonly
maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant
tradition in constitutional history. Some commentators trace the
tradition to the tenants of Jacksonian democracy that emphasized
individual liberty and distrust of government. 1Others who trace it
back to the founding argue that "The Supreme Court maintained an
astonishingly constant vision during its first 150 years."2 In either
case, today's conventional narrative depicts constitutional history
as having developed along a straight line: always with an emphasis
on individual liberty and always with a presumption that
entrepreneurial liberty should be favored over governments' power
to regulate.
1

Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government

Business Relations: Some ParametersofLaissez Faire Constitutionalism 18631897, 61 J. AMER. HiST. 970-1005 (1975); See also, HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993); DAVID
M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN APPLETON AND

RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990);
Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origin of Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV.,
293-331 (1985); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism:A Reconsideration, 53 J. AMER. HIST., 751-71 (1967); David
E. Bernstein, REHABILITATING LocHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2011).
2 Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism andLiberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
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This paper will use the 1877 case Munn v. Illinois as a lens
through which to take a fresh look at the development of
constitutional doctrine governing economic regulation. I will
demonstrate that the emphasis on entrepreneurial liberty is actually
a product of the Gilded Age. Prior to the late 1880s the paradigm
for determining the constitution's limits on government regulation
of business was actually quite different. There is no doubt that the
Court has always emphatically recognized the importance of
property rights. Nevertheless, during the first century under the
Constitution, it treated business regulation as a matter of balancing
entrepreneurial liberty against the rights of the community.
Furthermore, it consistently held that, because state economic
regulations were an expression of popular sovereignty and rights of
the community, they should be presumed to be valid.
Munn v. Illinois was one of eight related cases known as
the Granger Cases. 3 The others involved state laws regulating
railroads, but Munnchallenged the constitutionality of an Illinois
law that set maximum rates that grain elevators in the city of
Chicago could charge for storage. The firm of Munn and Scott,
which owned one of the elevators, complained that the state's
regulation of the rates they could charge deprived them of their
liberty and property without due process of law, and thus violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The Supreme Court disagreed.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite reasoned
that states could regulate "businesses affected with public
interest." 5 While doing so, however, Waite conceded that even
though statutes regulating the use of private property do not
necessarily deprive the owner of due process, under some

' Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1887); S. Minnesota
R.R. v. Coleman, 94 U.S. 180 (1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877);
Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Stone v. Wisconsin, 95 U.S. 181
(1877); Peik v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Lawrence v. Chicago
& Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
4 Munn, 94 U.S. at 123.
5 Id. at 130.
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circumstances they might.6 Moreover, the decision was not
unanimous. In one of his most well-known opinions, Justice
Stephen Field vehemently dissented. Munn thus became a focal
point in a fierce debate about the extent of the Constitution's
protection of property, the nature of individual liberty, and the role
of the state in providing for the general welfare and protecting the
rights of the community.
That debate secured Munn's place in history. According to
the conventional narrative, Munn plays a significant role as a
steppingstone in the straight-line evolution of constitutional
doctrine that emphasizes entrepreneurial liberty. Waite's
concession and Field's dissent laid the foundation for an era of
constitutional history sometimes referred to as the laissez-faire era.
Although the most fundamental meaning of due process was that
no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the
benefit of proper judicial hearing and procedure, Waite and Field
recognized that it promised something more. It was also meant to
protect private rights from arbitrary government interference,
regardless of whether that interference came from properly enacted
legislation. Thus, Munn is said to have opened the door for a
theory that viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool for
balancing economic liberty from government power: a theory that
would eventually become constitutional doctrine in the mid-1890s
and predominate until 1937. 7 At its high point the Court applied a
presumption that, in order for economic regulation to be
constitutional, a state must demonstrate that the regulation fell
within what was called the "legitimate police powers of the
state."8And, for the most part, it also subscribed to a narrow
definition of what constituted the legitimate police powers of the

6 Munn, 94 U.S. at 125.
7 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886-1937 112 (Paul L. Murphy ed.,

Greenwood Press 1998) (1990) ("All Justices of the Supreme Court in the last

third of the nineteenth century agreed with Madison that the fundamental
challenge of American Constitutionalism was mediating between the power of
government and the liberty of the individual.").
' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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state. Under this narrative, Munn thus has a place in constitutional
history not for what it did, but rather as a signal of things to come.
It is usually treated as a window to the future.
By looking at what the Court actually did in Munn-what it
held and what rationale it applied to reach its decision-it becomes
apparent that Munn is also a window to the past. A closer look at
the case and the events surrounding it will demonstrate that the
majority in Munn actually based its opinion on the traditional
emphasis on rights of the community. It will further demonstrate
that for more than a decade after the opinion, the Supreme Court
steadfastly clung to that traditional view. And it did so even in the
face of persistent efforts on the part of lawyers for a corporate elite
to change traditional constitutional doctrine. Their campaign to
change traditional doctrine involved: maintaining that government
regulation of business was the equivalent to confiscation of
property; expanding the constitutional rights afforded to
corporations, and; reversing the traditional rule that economic
regulation should be presumed valid. These changes eventually
raised entrepreneurial liberty to preferred status under the
Constitution, but they did not come about until well into the Gilded
Age.
II.

RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY

The dispute of which the Granger Cases were a part was
shaped in large degree by rapid changes in the economic and social
landscape. America in the late 1870s was evolving from a
predominantly local economic system to one that was national and
interconnected. It was a revolution in commerce that entirely
changed the way that people did business. And, to a large extent, it
depended on a new system of transportation that centered on
railroads. In fact, Munn v. Illinois was the only one of eight related
Granger cases that did not involve regulation of railroads but even
the regulation of grain warehouses in Munn was part of a system of
commerce linked to railroads.
In the late 1860s, business leaders from small towns took
the lead in calling for state control over the railroads. By the early
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1870s, farmers who had become organized as part of the Granger
movement joined the bourgeoning push for railroad reform. The
terms Grange or Granger were the popular names of the Patrons of
Husbandry, a farmers' alliance that came into being in 1867.
Although it began as a cooperative movement to encourage
education and trade among farmers, the Grangers quickly
developed a political presence.
The Granger movement grew at an astonishing rate, and in
1873 and 1874 farmers' organizations placed a significant number
of sympathetic representatives in the legislatures of Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Working with merchants, shippers, and
civic leaders they helped enact laws that created railroad
commissions to regulate railroads, prohibited railroads from
discriminating among customers, and set maximum rates railroads
and grain warehouses could charge for their services. The Grangers
influence in passing reform legislation has probably been
exaggerated. 9 Nevertheless, the image of the Grangers as an
agrarian revolt captured the popular imagination and the movement
gave its name to Munn v. Illinois and the related Granger Cases.
Economic self-interest played a role in the railroad reform
movement. The small town merchant, the shipper, or the farmer
may not have been able to articulate in the language of economics
their complaints about railroad ratemaking, but they understood the
feeling of being gouged. Although most reformers agreed that the
railroads had a right to make a profit, they also believed that
companies did not have the right to set rates arbitrarily without
regard to fairness.

9 GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971)

(traces in

detail the influence of small town merchants and shippers as well as farmers).
See also, SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL

MANIFESTATIONS, 1870-1880, 80-122 (1965); GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE
TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917

(1994), 78; Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases: Lord Hale and
Justice Bradley, 5 STA-N. L. REV. 587-678, 598-600 (1953).
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But raw self-interest was not the only concern in what
became known as "the railroad problem." Fear also played a role.
Railroads were transforming the country from a commercial
system made of regional and local economies to a system
dominated by a national economy. Even under the old system,
outside forces, like the weather or price of grain, impacted on the
livelihood of small town merchants and farmers. Now, swift
transportation allowed farm products to be sold at distant locations.
Massive storage facilities that mixed one farmer's produce with
another's allowed financiers to speculate in futures.' 0 In this new
national commercial system, outside forces over which they had no
control, had an even greater impact on the wellbeing of farmers
and small town shippers. James F. Hudson captured the feeling
when he complained that railroads "hold a greater power over the
fortunes and prosperity of individuals and communities than we
' Many reformers
have ever intrusted [sic] to our government."11
were motivated by a desire to take back some control of their own
economic destiny. 12
Reformers intuitively understood that individuals could not
achieve that fairness or take back control of their economic destiny
on their own. Granger leader, D.W. Adams, told his followers that
against the railroads, "the people, in their individual capacity, are
powerless and only through their united action as sovereigns can
they obtain redress." '1 3 In the minds of many railroad reformers
government alone had the strength to counterbalance the power
and privilege of the railroad corporation and it could do so by
enacting legislation regulating railroad rates and other practices.

10See

MILLER,

supra note 9, at 9-23; Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler,

The Facts ofMunn v. Illinois, SuP. CT. REV. 313-43 (1978).
11JAMES F. HUDSON, THE RAILWAYS AND THE REPUBLIC (1887). Hudson wrote

this during the debate over formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
but it captures the feelings of the Granger era as well.
12BERK, supra note 9, at 77-80.
13 EZRA CARR, PATRONS OF HUSBANDRY ON THE PACIFIC COAST 125 (1875).
(Annual Address of Worthy Master D.W. Adams, at the last session of the

National Grange, held in Charleston, February 1875).
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Reformers' instinct to turn to regulation was no surprise.
Regulation of business was common in nineteenth century
America. There was plenty of precedent in American history for
regulating prices and business practices. Mills, markets, hackmen
(cabbies), draymen (truckers), taverns, inns, and various
professions were just some of the businesses that states commonly
regulated. 14 The pervasiveness of regulations of business practices
undoubtedly reflects an understanding among the era's people,
policy makers, and judges that, while the right to own private
property was inviolable, the uses to which it might be put was
subject to regulation.
Even so, on some theoretical level, the idea of regulating
railroad rates and business practices ran afoul of American
society's traditional respect for the rights of private property. It is
because of this that the Granger laws and the Granger Cases are
often depicted as a conflict between governmental power and
private rights. As one opponent of regulation described it: "the
power of the community to regulate business against the right of
the citizen to enjoy the rewards of his enterprise."' 15 Indeed,
Americans have always had a degree of distrust of governmental
power, and a distrust of power, distrust of elites, and distrust of
government was characteristic of the Age of Jackson - the preCivil War years in which most reformers as well as railroad leaders
came of age. By choosing a paradigm that pitted government
power against property rights, railroad advocates and opponents of
regulation sought to emphasize that tradition and cast regulation in
the worst possible light.
The nineteenth century debate over economic regulation
was not just a matter of the government's assertion of power being
in conflict with an individual's property rights, however.
Reformers saw it more as a matter of weighing an individual's
claim of property rights against the rights of the people or the
rights of the community. Although this may seem like an overly
14 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

(1996).

15MILLER, supra note 9, at 181 (provides an example of this description).
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fine distinction, it is not. For it linked economic regulation to
another American tradition that is just as long standing and deeply
held as property rights. That tradition, as we shall see, is popular
sovereignty.
Emphasis on rights of the community or rights of the
people and popular sovereignty played a key role in political
debates over regulation. This was evident in the Illinois
Constitutional Convention of 1869-1870, which enacted the
constitutional reforms that set the stage for Munn. From the
opening days of discussions, in debates about building canals, or
public warehouses, limiting the state's borrowing authority, and
railroad ratemaking, reform minded delegates referred to the rights
of the people scores, perhaps even hundreds, of times. More
informative than how often they used the phrase, however, is how
they used it. On its most simple level the phrase was used to
convey a speaker's sense of the greater good. But the more
significant use of the phrase equated the "rights of the people" with
popular sovereignty. Henry W. Wells explained that the power to
regulate railroads derived from the rights of the people as
sovereign:
I believe it to be the right of the people, in their capacity as
sovereigns . . . to fix what tolls shall be reasonable for
these railroad companies to charge for transportation of
freight and passengers. The railroad companies have their
charters, but, behind, superior to them, are the rights of the
people which require them [the railroads] to exercise their
franchises consistently with the public [well-being]. 16
Popular sovereignty was said to give the people, as the
creators of corporations, the power to control their creation. As
Reuben M. Benjamin, a Harvard educated lawyer from
16

2

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, TUESDAY
DECEMBER

13, 1868, at 1656 (Ely, Burnham & Bartlett, Official Stenographers,

1870) [hereinafter DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]. See also MILLER, supra note
9, at 75-82 (discussing the Convention).
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Bloomington pointed out, a legislature, being a mere agent of the
people, could not bargain away the people's rights or diminish the
powers entrusted to it by the sovereign people. 17 Under this theory
the rights of the people would take precedence over a corporation's
claim that rate regulations 1would
violate its vested rights or rights
8
charter.
corporate
under its
The flip side of this belief that popular sovereignty justified
state regulation of railroads and other corporations was reformers'
fear that the growing political power of wealthy corporations
threatened popular sovereignty itself. This fear also found
expression in the Illinois Constitutional Convention where William
P. Peirce, for example, warned the delegation that, "one of the
greatest dangers to our republic is the great and rapidly increasing
wealth, the great extension and consolidation
of railroad
19
monopolies."'
chartered
corporations and
The Illinois Constitutional Convention adopted, and the
people ratified, reform measures that gave the legislature broad
powers to regulate railroads and warehouses. 20 In the following
years, the Illinois legislature passed several laws that were typical
of the Granger laws enacted in other Midwestern states. 21 One
required that railroads charge uniform rates for any class of goods.
This so-called "anti-discrimination provision" also specifically
outlawed the practice of charging higher rates for a short haul from
a town to a center of commerce than for a long haul from one
center of commerce to another. A second set maximum rates for
passenger service. A third act created a Board of Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioners, which was given the power to
17 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 16, at 1642. See additional

commentary by Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Holdup, and Mr. Bromwell. Id. at 1642,
1651, 1664. Benjamin later helped prepare the brief for the state in Munn v.
Illinois.MILLER, supranote 9, at 75 & 77.
18 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 1642, 1645.
19
Id. at 1645.
20

Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88, Part Two, in THE

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES. (New York: Macmillian) 7: 329; MILLER, supra note 9, at 7582.
2 See generally MILLER, supranote 9.
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prescribe maximum rates. Another, which was destined to become
the subject of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Munn v.
Illinois, set a maximum rate that could be charged for storing grain
in Chicago's grain elevators.22
As might be expected, much of the opposition to the
Granger laws came from railroad leaders. Some of these were
practical complaints. Railroad leaders argued that public
authorities, be they legislatures or commissions, were not
competent to determine proper rates and that the rates they set
would be unfair.23 The resulting rates, they predicted, would drive
out capital and make it impossible for railroads to meet their
obligations to bondholders. 24 The railroad leaders' most significant
contention was that the Granger laws violated their "exclusive
right to fix the rate of transportation., 25 Sometimes they insisted
that they derived this right from their charters. 26 But they also
believed that both rate regulation and anti-discrimination
provisions violated their property rights. In this vein Robert Harris
wrote, "They [the legislature] have made a clear issue in the
position assumed that they have the right to take away from the
owners of the roads their property absolutely if they saw fit. And
they seemed to have seen fit." 2 7 To this John N. Denison added

22

For description of these statutes, see Fairman, supranote 20, at 329-33 1;

MILLER, supra note 9, at 82-96; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 114-117 (1877)
reproduces the statute.
23 R. Harris to W.P. Hepburn, March 20, 1874, R. Harris out-letters, CB & Q,
Newberry Library, Chicago, IL.
24 j. M. Walker to "My Dear Counselor" (Hon. Sydney Bartlett), April 18, 1874;
J. M. Walker to O.H. Browning, April 20, 1874, J.M. Walker out-letters, CB &
Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL. Walker suggested that bondholders seek

injunctions in the federal courts against the company and the railroad
commission.
25 J.M. Walker to J.N. Dennison, July 10, 1874, J.M. Walker out-letters, CB&Q,
Newberry Library, Chicago, IL.
26 J.N. Denison to Jacob B. Jewett, October 15, 1873, J.N. Denison out-letters,
CB & Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL.
27 R. Harris to W.P. Hepburn, March 20, 1874, R.Harris out-letters, CB&Q,
Newberry Library.
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sarcastically, "I suppose
that there is no limit to the rights of the
28
sovereign people."
Although railroad leaders hoped to repeal or revise the
Granger laws, they did not trust state legislatures. Railroad
historian, Thomas C. Cochran noted, "Railroad men generally
expected more favorable consideration from courts than from
legislatures or commissions, more from judges than from juries,
29
and more from the highest courts than from inferior ones."
Letters between these men reveal that they also preferred federal
courts to state courts. 30 They also reveal that railroad leaders
understood the legal issues involved.
Railroad lawyers steadfastly advised their clients that the
Granger laws would not pass constitutional muster and polished
the legal theories upon which the railroads would rely. Their
advice set off a flurry of lawsuits in both the state and federal
courts. The affected companies employed two tactics to get their
cases into court: they either ignored the Granger legislation, thus
forcing the states to sue for enforcement, or they initiated lawsuits
that directly challenged the validity of the laws. 3 1 Either way, the
railroad lawyers' first contention in all the Granger cases except
Munn was that the state's effort to legislate rate regulation violated
the Article I, section 10 guarantees that "no
state shall pass any law
32
...impairing the obligation of contract."
In contract clause doctrine, franchises and acts of
incorporation were considered a contract between the state and the
28 J.N. Denison to N.M. Beckwith, April 7, 1873, J.N. Denison out-letters,
CB&Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL. Denison was at the time the chairman
of the board of the CB&Q.

29 THOMAS C. COCHRAN, RAILROAD LEADERS 1845-1890: THE BUSINESS
MIND

IN ACTION at 191 (1965).
30 See, J.M. Walker to O.H. Browning April 20, 1874; J.M. Walker to Sydney
Bartlett, May 14, 1874; J.M. Walker to Judge [illegible], April 14, 1874, J.M.
Walker out-letters, CB&Q, Newberry Library; J.N. Denison to N.M. Beckwith,
April 7, 1873; J.N. Denison to Jacob B. Jewett, October 15, 1873; J.N. Denison
out-letters, CB&Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL. See also, MILLER, supra
note 9, at 174-75.
31 MILLER, supra note 9, provides details regarding the legal tactics.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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corporation it had created.33 In theory a subsequent law placing
new conditions on the corporation would alter the terms of its
franchise, thus impairing the obligation of that contract. In
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company v. Iowa
railroad lawyers maintained the Granger laws did just that. In this
and the other Granger cases the railroads' grants were silent on the
subject of who had the ratemaking power. Yet lawyers argued that
the company's right to determine the rates they would charge was
an inherent part of their contract. The Supreme Court summarily
rejected this contention. "Railroad companies are carriers for hire,"
Chief Justice Waite reasoned. 34 "They are incorporated as such,
and are given extraordinary powers, in order that they may better
serve the public in that capacity." 35 As such, he concluded, they are
"subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight,
36
unless protected by their charters."
Even when the charter had an express provision allowing
the company to determine reasonable rates, as in Peik v. Chicago
and North Western Railway Company v. Lawrence, subsequent
37
legislation regulating rates might not violate the contract clause.
The reason was that contract clause doctrine included several
exceptions to the inviolability of the corporate franchise. The most
important of these recognized the state's right to include a
provision in the grant reserving to itself the power to later revise
the agreement. In Peik, the Court noted that the existence of such a
reserve clause meant the state had38 the power to pass subsequent
legislation that set maximum rates.
A state's reliance on reserve clauses was, however, also
subject to limitations. Under standard Contract Clause doctrine of
the time, even a reserve clause would not give a state the power to
defeat or substantially impair the essential object of the grant or
3' Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 519 (1819).
34 Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 161 (1877).
35 Id.
36 Id. (The Chief Justice also noted that they were businesses affected with
public interest as in Munn).
37 Peik v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co., 94 U.S. 164, 168 (1877).
3
8

[d.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXX

any rights vested under it.39 Under traditional doctrine the notion
of what constituted "the essential object of the grant" was broad
enough to make the Contract Clause a useful tool for protecting
existing corporations. 40 A corporation might turn to the contract
clause to claim its franchise was exclusive and the state could not
offer a new grant to a competitor. It might claim exemption from
taxation, or from subsequent state regulation. It was so useful in
this regard that some contemporary observers noted that the clause,
more than any other provision of the Constitution, was a source of
excessive and angry controversy. Others charged that the Contract
Clause was the bastion of corporate privilege and a shield for
corporate power. 4' Despite its usefulness in any particular case,
however, traditional Contract Clause doctrine did not provide what
railroad leaders wanted most - a constitutional condemnation of
state rate making authority in general. 42
To address this limitation, railroad attorneys in the Granger
Cases proposed a subtle but important variation on the rule that a
state cannot deprive a corporation of the essential object of its
grant. Attorneys for the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad
proposed the new theory to challenge the validity of a Wisconsin
maximum rate law. There they argued that, "This act ... takes the

income, and thus deprives the company of the beneficial use of its
property, and the means of performing its engagements with its
creditors, as ifthe road was confiscated. 4 3 The railroad's

39 Holyoke v. Lyman, 82 U.S. 500 (1872) (See as an example).
I, 50 ( 5th ed. 1873).
41James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two
40 ISAAC F. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF RAILWAYS

Constitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 370, at 397-99 (2005).

(citing

THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES, 280 n.2 ( 2 nd ed.

1871) (which sharply criticized the use of the Contract Clause as a shield for
Corporate Charters).
42 Id. at 401 (pointing out that railroads were seldom able to successfully claim
exemption from rate regulation by pointing to the language of their charters).
43 Peik v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co., 94 U.S. 164, 168 (1877)

(emphasis added).
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attorneys swayed one justice, Stephen Field. 4 But Field wrote in
dissent. The majority of the Court rejected this argument and
upheld the rate regulation.
The railroad's claim that regulation amounted to
confiscation highlighted the degree to which lawyers for the
corporate elite and reformers disagreed at the very most
fundamental level: the question of whether regulation was
consistent with American traditions and the American system of
government. Where reformers maintained that the traditions of
popular sovereignty and democracy justified or even required
regulation, railroad leaders and their lawyers argued that the
traditions of individual liberty and limited government prohibited
it. Charles B. Lawrence, attorney for the Chicago & Northwestern
Railroad, warned that "The idea that the legislature has the general
power to set maximum rates is at war with every principle of free
government, and all those provisions of our American Constitution
which were designed to protect the natural rights of man against
legislative
aggression. , 45 Another
of the
Chicago
&
Northwestern's lawyers, John Cary, maintained that the Granger
legislation amounted to "communism pure and simple" which, if
not checked, would "ultimately overthrow not only the rights of
property, but personal liberty and independence as well. 46
While it was not unusual for opponents to cast the Granger
laws as the product of an agrarian revolt, radical agrarianism, or
communism, the roots of railroad reform were anything but
radical. Historian, George H. Miller, has convincingly
demonstrated that the call for reform originated in the business
communities of small town America. Moreover, the theoretical
underpinnings of reform can only be described as radical if we are
44 Field used Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. (4 Otto.) 181, 183 (1877) to express his
dissent in all the Granger cases involving corporations. Field actually claims that
the majority misses an opportunity to define the limits of the power of the states
over corporations. He definitely rejected the Court's rationale in Munn and thus
its application to the cases involving the contract clause.
45 MILLER, supra note 9, at 185 (citing C.B. Lawrence's argument in Peik, 94
U.S. 164 (1877)).
46 Id. at 185 (citing John Cary's argument in Peik, 94 U.S. 164 (1877)).
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willing to describe the American Constitution itself as radical. The
theory of inalienable popular sovereignty that was so evident in the
Illinois Constitutional Convention derives from one of the most
revered ideals of the American founding. 47
The principle of popular sovereignty and the concomitant
respect for rights of the community also was well entrenched in
American Constitutional doctrine. The most famous statement of
this principle is found in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.48 Rejecting the Charles River
Bridge Company's claim that its charter implied an exclusive right
to operate a bridge over the Charles River, Taney reasoned that,
"[T]he object and end of all government is to promote the
happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is
established, and it can never be assumed that the government
intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the ends for which
it was created., 49 For Taney, the presumption in favor of the state
was not just a matter of governmental power versus individual
liberty. It was also a matter of balancing property rights against the
rights of the community. "While the rights of private property are
sacredly guarded," he observed, "we must not forget that the
community also have rights, and that the happiness and
well being
' 50
of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation."
The notion that a legislature could not bargain away the
attributes of a state's sovereignty also found expression in
traditional constitutional law in cases interpreting the meaning of
the contract clause. Thomas M. Cooley, the most renowned
constitutional scholar of the time, pointed out that:

47 Two recent studies that emphasize the importance of popular sovereignty are:
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
48

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).

49 Id. at 547.
50

Id. at 547.
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• . . the State could not barter away, or in any manner
abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers which are
inherent in all governments, and the existence of such in
full vigor is important to the well being of organized
society; and that any contracts to that end, being without
authority, cannot be enforced under the provisions of the
[contract clause] .51

Among those essential powers Cooley listed the police power, the
power of eminent domain, and the taxing power. 52 Cooley was firm
that a legislature could not bargain
away the police power of the
53
grant.
express
an
by
even
state
That left open the question of whether economic regulation,
especially regulation of rates and prices, fell within the normal
police powers of the state. The history of economic regulation in
early America makes it clear that most people and legislators
thought it was. Americans accepted the distinction between the
right of property and the rules of conduct under which property may
be used.54 Licensing, building and regulating public markets,
controlling prices or quality of common goods, use of and access to
waterways, eminent domain law, public trust doctrine, and the law
51 Thomas M. Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH

REST UPON

AMERICAN UNION
52

THE

LEGISLATIVE

POWER

OF

THE

STATES

OF

THE

283 (1874).

Id. at 280-84. See also Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217, 222 (1876) [taxes].

The Court applied this presumption in a similar case, ruling that when two
companies consolidated a tax exemption applies only to the part of the new
company that received it in the first place. Central Railroad and Banking
Company v. Georgia, 92 U.S. 665 (1875); In a similar vein it ruled that a
contract that exempted companies from a state tax did not imply that
municipalities could not tax those companies, and that a grant of temporary tax
immunity did not imply that a company was permanently exempted from being
taxed. Home Insurance Company v. City Councils of Augusta, 93 U.S. 116
(1876); Bailey v. Magwire, 89 U.S. 215 (1874); Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S.

527 (1874).
53 Id. at 283.
54 Stephen A. Siegel,

Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the
Controversy Over Railroadand Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187,

197-98 (1984).
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of nuisance are common examples of states regulating the economy
in the public interest. And the list goes on. Although the state's
power to interfere with property was not unlimited, nineteenth
century Americans certainly considered regulation normal.55
Regulation was also considered normal in nineteenth
century legal doctrine. Judges and commentators gave states wide
latitude regarding economic regulation. Moreover, they justified
regulation not only in terms of balancing government power against
individual liberty, but also in terms of protecting the rights of the
public. Historian Harry Scheiber thus concluded, ".

.

. American

judges and legal commentators have given sustained, explicit, and
systematic attention to the notion that the public, and not only
private parties, have "rights" that must be recognized and honored
if there is to be rule of law.' 56 He and others commonly use
Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's 1851 opinion in
Commonwealth v. Alger to support the point:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature
of a well ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it
may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the

55See Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept
of PublicPurpose in the State Courts, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329-331 (Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn,

Eds., 1971); Novak, supra note 14; Gregory A. Mark, BOOK

REVIEW,

H-NET

REVIEWS (Nov. 1999) (Reviewing WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S
WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996))

http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cig?path-5155944065677
(observing that Novak's discussion of official markets demonstrated the

naturalness of exchange and of regulation).
56 Harry N. Scheiber Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal

History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 219 (1984); see also Philip A. Talmadge, The
Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The Interaction of
Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857 (2000) (taking a

similar position as a modern observer).
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enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of
57
the community.
Defining the reach of state power to regulate the economy,
including regulation of rates and prices, was a matter primarily left
to the states themselves. This general rule applied to railroads as
much as any other business and, although many states gave
companies flexibility to set their own rates, regulation of railroad
rates was a normal practice. 58
Both common practice regarding economic regulation and
legal doctrine indicate that, if by radical we mean an agent of
change, the term more accurately applies to railroad lawyers than
proponents of rate regulation. The lawyers who represented the
railroads in the Granger Cases were among the most distinguished
lawyers in America. They must have realized that under contract
clause doctrine, as it stood, they really did not have very good
cases. Yet they pressed on, in all likelihood because they had a
purposeful and calculated desire to change the status of the law.
They wanted to establish a doctrine that the Constitution
guaranteed a fundamental right to be free of the type of price
regulations created in the Granger laws. Such a doctrine would
59
remove the issue of regulation from the political process.
57 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84-85 (Mass. 1851) (emphasis added).
Shaw goes on to say "All property in this commonwealth.... is derived directly
or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those regulations, which
are necessary to the common good and general welfare." See, Scheiber, Public
Rights, supra note 56 at 222-23; Novak, supra note 14, at 19-20. (It is

interesting that Shaw's language begins as a statement very similar to what
advocates of laissez-faire constitutionalism would later use to describe the limits
of property rights. That language, which was captured by the Latin maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the
property of others), differs only in that it drops the reference to the rights of the
community).
58 MILLER, supra note 9, at 31; JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS & AMERICAN

LAW, 71-90 (2001) (recognizing that regulation of rates was common but
emphasized that legislative ratemaking was often ineffective).
59 1borrowed some of the following description from my own previous writings
on Munn in PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE

GOLD RUSH To THE GILDED AGE, 164-66 (1997).
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Hindsight tells us that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than the Contract Clause, would provide the
vehicle for change.
The idea behind this theory was that government regulation
denied businesses of both their property and their liberty and thus
violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall
deny any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The tactic of using the Fourteenth Amendment as a barrier to
government regulation, however, was novel at the time. Ratified in
1868 in the aftermath of the Civil War, the amendment
undoubtedly contained language sweeping enough to be used for
the railroad leaders' purposes. Dissenting opinions in the The
Slaughterhouse Cases, the first case to interpret the new
Amendment, did support the idea that it provided protection for
business. But the majority in that case, emphasizing that the
overriding purpose of the Amendment was to guarantee the rights
of recently freed slaves, soundly rejected the theory. Railroad
leaders, who may have understood this limitation, nevertheless
clearly intended to initiate a campaign to bring regulation within
the protections of the due process clause. Regarding one suit
brought against the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, James M.
Walker, the company's president, gave the following directive to
his lawyers:
No pains must be spared upon this defense. It will take a
great deal of time and much labor, perhaps more than any
suit the company has had .... The first suggestion that I
have to make is whether this case cannot be removed to the
United States Court under the 14
th Amendment and the law
61
thereof.
pursuance
in
and
under
60

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
0. H. Browning, on J.M. Walker out-papers (Mar.

61 Letter from J.M. Walker to

7, 1874) (on file with CB&Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL). Walker
continued, "Beckwith is disposed to think it can be. I enclose you his

suggestions." [Possibly referring to Warren Beckwith, road master of the
Burlington & Missouri River Railroad].
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THE DEBATE IN MUNN

Munn v. Illinois would provide the first proving ground to
test the theory. Contract Clause arguments were not available in
Munn because, unlike the other Granger cases, it did not involve a
railroad and it did not involve a corporation. The defendant in this
case was Munn & Scott, a partnership that owned and operated
grain elevators along the Chicago River. The case began when
Munn & Scott was charged with violating an Illinois law that set
maximum rates that elevators could charge for storing and
handling grain.
Chicago's grain elevators were both a product and a
symbol of the commercial revolution that was taking place in the
late 19th century. In this system of commerce the sale and storage
of grain was not a local transaction as it had been in the past. Most
of the grain produced in the Midwest in the 1870s made its way to
the Chicago lakefront. There it was held for shipment via the Great
Lakes or railroad to Eastern markets. All of the grain that reached
this gathering point was stored in fourteen immense elevators,
owned by nine business firms of which Munn & Scott was one.
Most of the firms were directly connected to a particular railroad,
often leasing the elevator from the railroad company.
From the farmers' point of view, this new system
fundamentally changed the way farm goods were marketed. The
tendency to store grain in immense facilities concentrated in one
location, combined with the ability to disperse them quickly
through a web of railroad routes, allowed buyers to hold their grain
hoping for the highest price. It essentially created a new business
of speculating in grain futures. With speculation affecting the price
of grain, farmers, whose livelihood had always been at the mercy
of factors beyond their control, now faced still62 another obstacle
that seemed just as unpredictable as the weather.
Adding to the farmers' dissatisfaction was the fact that
cooperation among the nine Chicago firms allowed them to fix the
62

See,

WEST

WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT

(W.W. Norton & Co. 1991) for an overview of the changes.
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prices they charged for storage of grain. This caused the Grangers
to push for regulation of Chicago's grain elevators. But collusion
was not the only complaint leveled against the elevators and the
Grangers were not the only group calling for regulation.
Complaints also came from shippers who claimed that the
elevators often under-weighed their shipments and undervalued the
quality of their grain. They also came from traders in grain futures.
For them the elevator firms' practice of overstating the amount and
quality of grain they held, and their refusal to allow inspection,
turned investment strategy into nothing more than a gamble. The
staunchest proponent for regulating the elevators was not the
Grangers, but the Chicago Board of Trade, who wanted a uniform
system of inspection. 63
Whatever the validity of complaints against the elevators,
there is no doubt that the new market system created a bottleneck
of commerce in the Chicago harbor. Nor is there any doubt that
control of that bottleneck gave the owners of Chicago's elevators a
stranglehold on the flow of commerce in the Midwest. When Munn
v. Illinois reached the Supreme Court, William G. Goudy and John
N. Jewett, the lawyers for Munn & Scott, turned this complaint on
its head. Describing the elevators as an essential cog in a national
market of grain, they maintained that the Illinois maximum rate
law violated Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 64 But their
most important claim was that the state regulations violated the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The concept of due process, sometimes referred to as "the
law of the land," predates the Fourteenth Amendment. It traces its
63 Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, SuP.

CT. REv. 313-343 (1978). Kitch and Bowler point out that the most important
reform for the Board of Trade was a system of uniform inspection. Rates were a
secondary matter. Id. at 325. Railroad leaders expressed some concern about
filling elevators for purposes of speculation. Letter from W.K. Ackerman to
Capt. W.P. Halliday. W.K. Ackerman out-letters, Illinois Central, Newberry
Library, Chicago, IL. (Sept. 6, 1881).
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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roots to the Magna Carta and is found in most state constitutions. It
is also important to know that the guarantee is also found in the
Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person "shall be
65
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Although standard constitutional doctrine of the time held that the
Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, did not apply to the
states, the guarantee of due process of law was part of the U.S.
Constitution for almost a century before Munn. Its most
fundamental meaning was that no person could be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without the benefit of proper judicial hearing
and procedure. In Munn, however, company attorneys argued that
due process promised more than a trial according to settled judicial
procedure. The guarantee, they maintained, was also meant to
protect private rights from arbitrary government interference. This
theory concentrated on the substance of legislation rather than the
procedure by which the law was enforced. Substantive due
process, as it thus came to be called, would give the federal
judiciary the authority to overrule state legislation that interfered
with individual rights.
The idea that the Constitution prohibits arbitrary assertions
of government power that threatened individual liberty is
undoubtedly part of the American legal tradition, but there was
only sparse legal precedent to support the theory of due process
and judicial power the company attorneys were proposing. They
pointed to Daniel Webster's famous statement in the Dartmouth
College case of 1819.66 The meaning of due process, Webster had
reasoned:
is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the general rules which govern society.
Everything which may pass under the form of [legislative]
enactment is not considered the law of the land.6 7
amend. V.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
W.C. GOUDY, BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, MUAN V V. ILLINOIS,

65 U.S.CONST.
66

67

IN
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Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXX

They could refer the Court to Thomas Cooley's treatise,
ConstitutionalLimitations,which maintained that legislation could
not interfere with vested rights beyond what was allowed by
"settled maxims of law" and safeguards for the protection of
individual rights. 68 They could also draw upon some state court
opinions to support their argument. The most well-known of these
was Wynehamer v. New York, an 1856 case where New York's
highest court ruled that a statute prohibiting the sale and possession
of, and authorizing 69
the destruction of, alcoholic beverages violated
law.
of
process
due
Other than that, there was little support for the argument.
The United States Supreme Court had used the concept of
substantive due process only once, applying it to the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause in the infamous Dred Scott
case. 70 Justice Bradley had employed the theory in his opinion in
The Slaughter-House Cases, which was the first case interpreting
the new Fourteenth Amendment. But Bradley's opinion was a
dissent. 7' Justice Miller's opinion for the majority in that case
conspicuously ignored the substantive due process argument.
Miller did the same in the State RailroadTax Cases, decided just a
year before Munn. When railroad attorneys had argued that an
Illinois plan for taxing railroad property took company property
without due process, Miller's only response was, "The validity of
the statute is not seriously questioned here on the ground of any
conflict with the Constitution of the United States. 72
Weaknesses aside, Jewett and Goudy were committed to
their strategy. It would be easy enough for them to establish the
general proposition that property rights fell among those liberties
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 511 (eds. Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard

Casper, VII, 1975).

68Id. at 512 (citing COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 351).

69 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 427 (1856). See also, James W. Ely, Jr.,
The Oxymoron Reconsidered. Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive
Due Process, 16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 315, 338-44 (1999).
70 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857).
71 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
72 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 596, 618 (1875).
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the Constitution was intended to protect. Nobody would disagree
with that basic contention. The Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Contract Clause all contained provisions that
protected property. The task that would test the company
attorneys' skill was to show that setting maximum rates for grain
elevators and railroads constituted the type of government activity
that violated their clients' property rights.
The key was to convince the Court that regulation of rates
amounted to confiscation. From a relatively recent Fifth
Amendment case in which a government-sponsored canal project
had flooded an individual's adjacent land, they offered the
principle that destroying the value of property constituted
confiscation.73 Rate regulation, they said, had the same effect. John
Jewett best captured their argument: "it is not merely the title and
possession of property that the Constitution is designed to protect,
but along with this, the control of the uses and income, the right of
valuation and disposition, without
which property ceases to be
74
profitable, or even desirable."
Jewett and Goudy's argument embodied an attitude toward
property rights that one modern observer, Mary Ann Glendon,
calls an "illusion of absoluteness. 75 The illusion lay in their
presumption that an owner has absolute dominion over his or her
property. In other words, Jewett and Goudy rejected the idea that
the owner's dominion over property can be limited by the rights of
the community. Jewett made this abundantly clear. Ignoring the
long tradition of economic regulation for the good of the
community, including rate and price regulation, he maintained that,
"for the first time since the Union of these States, a legislature of a
State has attempted to control the property, capital and labor of a
73Goudy, supra note 67, at 515 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
166, 177-78 (1871); John Jewett, Briefs for Plaintiffs in Error, in LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 535, 558 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds.,

1975) (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. 166 (1871).

74 Jewett, supra note 73, at 557.

75 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 18-46 (1991).
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private individual, by fixing the prices he may receive from other
private persons, who choose to deal with him." 76 Rather than
balancing individual property rights against the rights of the
community, Jewett postured the dispute as one of individual
property rights versus government power. Legislation fixing prices
represented an arbitrary and irresponsible power, he said, a power
practically
to annihilate private property by destroying the value of
77
its use.

To the extent that they predicted the Court would invalidate
the Granger laws, the company attorneys had badly miscalculated.
Writing for a 7 to 2 majority in Munn v. Illinois, Chief Justice
Waite upheld the Illinois warehouse regulations. Nevertheless, the
Court had faced a barrage of legal argument from a force of the
nation's most prominent attorneys. In the process of explaining
why the Court had upheld the regulations, the Chief Justice made
some concessions.
It was a major concession to the opponents of regulation
that Waite did not deny the theory of substantive due process.
Statutes regulating the use of private property do not necessarily
deprive the owner of his property without due process of law,
Waite wrote. "Under some circumstances they may, but not under
all.",78 The Chief Justice admitted that the state has limited
authority to interfere with property that is exclusively private. But
when property is "affected with public interest," he continued, it
ceases to be juris privati only and is thus subject79to more extensive
regulation for promotion of the general welfare.
Company lawyers must have been especially dismayed that
Justice Bradley voted with the majority to uphold the regulation. In
the past, Bradley had shown an inclination to vote against state
regulation. Four years earlier, in the first case interpreting the
newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment, the Court upheld a
Louisiana statute that created a central slaughterhouse and required

76

Goudy, supranote 73, at 483.

77 Jewett, supra note 73, at 549.
78
79

Munn, 94 U.S. at 125.
[d. at 127.
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80
that all butchers in New Orleans ply their trade in that facility.
Bradley had joined Field and Strong dissenting in the SlaughterHouse Cases, and in his separate opinion in that case had done the
most to articulate the idea that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment gave the Court power to oversee the
substance of state legislation. Now, in Munn, only Field and Strong
dissented. Not only had Bradley seemed to have changed sides, as
it turned out, he was the member of the Court most responsible for
developing the "business affected with public interest" doctrine. In
a memo "Outline of my views on the subject of the Granger
Cases," Bradley acquainted Chief Justice Waite with the
seventeenth century writings of British jurist Lord Chief Justice
Hale who ruled that owners of wharves, cranes, or other
conveniences used by the public must charge reasonable and
moderate rates81because those conveniences are affected with a
public interest.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, Bradley and Field had
agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty
included a right to choose a trade or calling. They agreed that
government regulation of business could infringe upon this right to
a degree that it violated the Constitution. They also agreed that
monopoly posed a threat to individual liberty and a free society.
The extent to which they had agreed in the earlier case makes their
disagreement in Munn even more enlightening and, by writing his
memo to the Chief Justice; Bradley left an unusually vivid source
of his views.
The disagreement between Bradley and Field begins with
their differing definitions of "business affected with public
interest." Field's interpretation of the phrase conformed to his
belief that regulation was appropriate only for government-created
monopolies. He pointed out that the writings of Lord Hale and
many of the cases upon which Waite and Bradley relied, involved
80
81

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82-83 (1873).
Munn, 94 U.S. at 127. We have Charles Fairman to thank for bringing

Bradley's "Outline of my views on the subject of the Granger Cases" to light.
Charles Fairman, The So-CalledGrangerCases:Lord HaleandJustice Bradley.

5 STAr. L. REv. 587 (1953) (Fairman reproduces the Bradley Memorandum).
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companies that operated under an exclusive franchise-either by
prerogative of the king or contract with the state. 82 The elevators in
Munn, he argued, were private companies with no such exclusive
franchise. To apply the rule to this kind of company would leave
the state with an unlimited power to regulate private property.
There would be no way to tell what business
was affected with
83
public interest and what business was not.
Although Waite and Bradley failed to articulate a general
rule, on one point they were very clear. Whatever might be the
boundaries of the "affected with public interest" doctrine, the
Chicago elevators fell within it because they operated as virtual
monopolies. In this sense, they saw the facts of Munn and the facts
of the Slaughter-House Cases as having much in common. In
neither case did the company have an actual monopoly, but in both
they dominated some essential element of a particular business. All
of the butchers in New Orleans had to ply their trade in the
Crescent City Company's slaughterhouse. Similarly, all grain
shipped through Chicago had to be stored in the elevators owned
by a few firms that cooperated to fix prices. The only significant
difference between the two situations was the source of their
privileged position. The New Orleans slaughterhouse obtained its
privilege by virtue of a government franchise; the Chicago
elevators attained theirs through private ownership and
cooperation. This made all the difference in the world to Field but
no difference at all to Waite and Bradley. Waite used the company
attorney's own commerce clause argument to explain why:
[The elevators] stand, to use again the language of counsel,
in the very "gateway of commerce," and take a toll from all
who pass. Their business most certainly "tends to a
common charge, and is become a thing of public interest
and use." Every bushel of grain for its passage "pays a toll,
which is a common charge," and, therefore, according to
12
83

Munn, 94 U.S. at 139-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 139-41 (Field, J., dissenting).
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Lord Hale, every such warehouseman "ought to be under
public regulation, viz., that he take but a reasonable toll."
Certainly, if any business can be clothed "with public
84
interest," and cease to bejurisprivationly, this has been.
Likewise for Bradley, the source of a monopoly was of
little consequence. The important thing for him was that the public
could not stand on equal footing with companies such as railroads
and Chicago grain elevators. Despite the company attorneys'
success in painting themselves as defenders of liberty and
government oppression, Bradley did not forget that the heart of this
dispute was a fundamental disagreement about the meaning of
liberty and democracy. And, because his memo "Outline of my
views on the subject of the Granger Cases" was only for his own
use and Waite's, Bradley did not mince words. "Unrestricted
monopolies as to those things which people must have and use, are
a canker in any society, and have ever been the occasion of civil
convulsions and revolutions," he wrote.8 5 "A people disposed to
freedom will not tolerate this kind of oppression
at the hands of
86
private corporations or powerful citizens."
Bradley's memo undoubtedly influenced Chief Justice
Waite's use of the "affected with public interest" formula in his
opinion for the Court. But there was more to Waite's opinion. His
reasoning also reflected a personal discomfort with the absolutist
version of property rights that Jewett and Goudy favored, and a
keen appreciation of the ideals of popular sovereignty and the
rights of the people.
Waite's reluctance to accept substantive due process and
discomfort in accommodating the absolutist view of property rights
were put on display when he tried to explain guidelines for
applying the "affected with public interest" formula. "Property
does become clothed with public interest," Waite wrote, "when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the

84
85
86

Munn, 94 U.S. at 132.
Fairman, supra,note 81, at 670.
[d.
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community at large."8 7 So broad was this definition that it caused
Justice Stephen Field, a champion of the absolutist view of
property rights, to complain:
If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the
principles upon which our republican government is
founded, or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against
such invasion of private rights, all property and all business
in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its
legislature.88
Despite this strong language, even Field agreed that
businesses were subject to the police power of the state. Unlike the
majority, however, he did not believe that regulation of rates fell
within the police power. Field did not give us much help in
determining why he reached that conclusion. The police power, he
said, extended to "whatever affects the peace, good order, morals,
and health of the community ....,,89 In applying it, he continued,

the state must be guided by the doctrine that each one must use his
own and not to injure his neighbor. 90 On the basis of these
principles he then concluded that "the compensation which owners
of property, not having any special rights or privileges from the
government in connection with it, may demand for its use... "
does not fall within that power. 9' Perhaps the most important factor
leading Field to this conclusion was the presumption from which
he started. Constitutional provisions intended for the protection of
property, he insisted, should be liberally construed. 92 His

17

Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.

88 Id. at 140 (Field, J., dissenting).

'9 Id. at 145 (Field, J., dissenting).
90

Id.at 148.

91 Id. at 146 (Field, J., dissenting). Scheiber, supra note 55, at 389-91. (noting

that Field and Cooley favored a more limited use of taxation in support of
railroads because they understood the link to justifying greater police power

regulations).
92

Munn, 94 U.S. at 142-43 (Field, J., dissenting).
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implication was that the Court should be wary of any statute that
interfered with individual liberty.
The Waite majority, by contrast, started from the opposite
presumption. Waite would assume that the legislation is valid
unless proven otherwise. "Every statute is presumed to be
constitutional," he wrote. 93 "The court ought not to declare one to
be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the
express will of the legislature should be sustained., 94 While he
admitted that a state regulation might deprive an individual of
property without due process of law, he would uphold a regulation
**
if a state of facts could exist that would justify such
legislation" and would declare a regulation void only ". .95. if no
state ofcircumstances could exist to justify such a statute."
The majority's presumption found solid roots in
conventional Contract Clause doctrine of the time. It could be
traced back to the majority ruling in the 1837 CharlesRiver Bridge
Case, which was discussed earlier. There the Court ruled that, in
interpreting the meaning of a state granted charter, every legal
presumption should be in favor of the state's power to protect the
rights of the public. 96 Waite reiterated this idea in Munn observing
that, "When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts
with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected
by his relations with others, he might retain." 97 "Under the police
powers," he continued, "the government regulates the conduct of
its citizens, one towards another, and the manner in which each
shall use his property, when such regulation becomes necessary for
the public good." 9 8
The majority's presumption in favor of state legislation
certainly disappointed railroad leaders and their attorneys who had
93Id. at 123.
94

id.

95 Id. at

132 (emphasis added).

96 Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 420 (1837).

97 Munn, 94 U.S. at 124. Waite continued, "A body politic is a social compact by
which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good."
98 Id. at 125.
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hoped to move the question of what constituted reasonable rates
and regulations from the legislative arena to the judicial. Field
captured their position, and their distrust for the democratic
process, in his dissent. "Government can scarcely be free where the
rights of property are left solely dependent on the will of the
legislative body without any restraint," he warned. 99 And, in his
mind, it was the Court's duty to ensure that this did not happen.
Contrary to Field, the majority of the Court believed that, in
most instances, property rights would be adequately protected
without judicial interference. Of course Waite could not deny that
a state might abuse its power. But, for protection against that
potential abuse, he said, "people must resort to the polls, not to the
courts."' 100 Bradley agreed and, in the process, revealed respect for
popular sovereignty reminiscent of the debates in the Illinois
Constitutional Convention. "The right to regulate rates and to
declare what are reasonable and what are not must be regarded as
reserved to the legislature."'' 1 Any other rule, he said, "Would be
subversive to the authority which
the people have confided to the
10 2
protection."'
their
for
legislature
IV.

MUNN: AFTERMATH AND LEGACY

For railroad leaders, who placed much more faith in
appellate courts than in elected legislatures, the majority decision
inflicted a brutal blow. They had dreamed that the decision would
establish an unequivocal right to be free of government regulation.
More realistically, they hoped it would produce a doctrine that the
reasonableness of government rates and regulations was inherently
a judicial question and that courts would presume that rate
regulation was an unconstitutional form of confiscation. Instead,
the Supreme Court's decision in Munn reaffirmed the right of state
legislatures to regulate.
U.S. at 148 (Field, J., dissenting).
'00 Id. at 134.
101 Fairman, supra note 9, at 677.

99 Munn, 94

102 id.
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John Jewett, one of the attorneys for Munn and Scott,
warned that the opinion "has sent a chill of apprehension through
the very heart of the business enterprises of the nation." 103 Robert
Harris, President of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad,
also detected a dire omen in Munn. Ignoring the fact that the nation
was still in the throngs of an economic depression that began in
1873 and that the depression was caused in part by overexpansion
of railroads and other railroad practices, he blamed the Court's
decision for the drop in value of railroad stock. Harris predicted
that the Court "has turned over this vast property to the whim of a
legislative committee." "If this is good law," he complained, "then
corporate property is the only property that has no protection [from
legislative interference]. ',1 ° 4
Reformers, as would be expected, found comfort in the
decision. Two years later, delegates to the California constitutional
convention pointed to Munn as proof that they had the authority to
regulate railroad rates and fares.' 0 5 And, even a decade later, a
reform-minded governor of Minnesota reminded the legislature
that while the expediency of railroad regulation might be doubted,
the right of the state to regulate is no longer in question. 1°6 Editors
of the Minneapolis Tribune were even more confident. "The power
to regulate roads has been confirmed by the United States Supreme

103Jewett,
104

supranote 73, at 662.
Letter from R. Harris to Schuylar Colfax (Mar. 12, 1877) (on file in R. Harris

out-letters, president's office, CB& Q, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL). The
actual quote is "if this is good law, then corporate property is the only property
that has no protection from the constitutions of the Western States." Id.; see
also, Letter from R. Harris to James Wentworth (March 9, 1877) (on file in R.
Harris Out-Letters, President's Office, The Newberry Library, Chicago, IL).
1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO,
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1878, at 455, 463, 482, 509 (Sacramento, State
105

Office 1880).
106 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION
22-23

(1993) (citing MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Jan. 6 1887, at 3 (statement of Governor R.
McGill).
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Court in the Granger Cases, 0there
is no turning back and the
7
ground will never be retraced."'1
The second part of the Tribune's observation would prove
to be wrong. By the mid 1890s the Court would reject Munn and
replace it with a doctrine of substantive due process that took
inspiration from Field's dissent. This new doctrine would give
much of what railroad and corporate leaders had wanted. Under it,
all state regulation of rates would be suspected of being a
confiscation of property that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court would thus become the final arbitrator of the validity of
rates. Reflecting a distrust of the democratic process, the Court
would start from a presumption that rate regulation violated
individual liberty. It would also develop a narrow definition of the
police powers of the state-that range of legitimate state authority
to interfere with liberty.' 08 Because of its emphasis on
entrepreneurial liberty, this new doctrine is often referred to as
laissez-faire constitutionalism.
Although laissez-faire constitutionalism did not become
entrenched until more than a decade afterward, constitutional
history tends to treat Munn as a steppingstone in the development
of that doctrine. Interest in the case tends to be directed toward
Waite's "affected with public interest" formula. 10 9 Modern
treatment of the case also highlights Waite's concession that some
regulation may violate due process, and Field's dissent that all
legislation should be presumed to do so. Chief Justice Waite's
biographer points out that instead of being remembered as a
victory for public regulation, Munn is thus more often viewed as
the ideological forerunner to an era that emphasized economic
liberty and saw the Court as a bulwark protecting business against
interference of state regulation.'1' From this perspective it is
107

Id. at 38 (quoting MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Dec. 24 1887, at 4).
W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W.

108 See, JAMES

FULLER:

1888-1910, at 57-71 (1995).

109 See, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110 C.

PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER at

192-93 (1963).
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common to conclude that the Court quickly moved away from the
Munn doctrine.
It is also commonly, and mistakenly, believed that Munn
immediately came under attack from attorneys for railroad,
industrial, and financial interests. Perhaps Justice Miller helped
fuel that idea when he complained a year later, in Davidson v. New
Orleans, that the Court's docket "is crowded with cases in which
we are asked to hold that state Courts and State legislatures have
deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due
' This proliferation of cases, he said, was the
process of law."111
result of "some strange misconception of the scope of this
provision of the fourteenth amendment." 112
Miller further complained that attorneys were viewing the
Fourteenth Amendment as a means of bringing to the United States
Supreme Court "the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful
litigant in a State court [about] the justice of the decision against
him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision
may be founded."' 3 His stern criticism certainly conveyed a
warning to business attorneys who might be looking for a new
means to fight economic regulations enacted by state
legislatures. 114 In 1878 the Court issued one other opinion
involving a claim that economic regulation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, Railroad Company v. Richmond.115 But after the
Court had disposed of Davidson v. New Orleans and Railroad
Company v. Richmondin 1878, roughly six years would pass
before its docket was actually crowded with cases in which it was
asked to hold that state economic regulation deprived their own
citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

"' 96 U.S. 97, 104.
112 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
113Id. at

104.

114 MICHAEL

A. Ross,

JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN

MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA at 233 (2003).
115 96 U.S. 521, 529 (1878) (The Court first rejected the company's
claim that
the ordinance violated the contract clause. Justice Strong dissented without

comment).
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Railroad and business attorneys instead turned back to the
contract clause to protect their client's interests. In at least one
instance, attorneys even went out of their way to assure the Court
that, "the company does not invoke the aid of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, but submits that the statute . . .
impairs the obligation of the contract'1 contained
in its charter and is
16
therefore unconstitutional and void."
In response, the Court continued to apply principles for
interpreting the Contract Clause that had developed earlier. One
such principle was the presumption that a charter must be
construed most favorably for the interests of the public. The
outcome in Northwestern Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park
turned on this rule of construction. This case involved an ordinance
that had the effect of prohibiting the company from operating a
fertilizing plant in the village of Hyde Park, Illinois. The company
had received a charter from the state to operate, in an uninhabited
area south of the village, a plant that turned offal and other
byproducts of Chicago slaughterhouses into fertilizer. As Hyde
Park grew, however, the plant became ".

.

.

an unendurable

nuisance to the inhabitants for many miles around its location...
,,117 Some justices were sympathetic to the company's claim that
the ordinance had the effect of confiscating its property without
compensation.! 18 But Justice Noah Swayne, who wrote the
majority opinion, pointed out that the company's charter did not
contain a provision expressly exempting it from claims of
nuisance. Applying the rule of construction that a charter should be
construed most strongly against the corporation, he concluded that
the charter's silence on the matter was fatal to the company's
claim. 119
116Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U.S. 25, 27 (1878).
117 N.W. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 664 (1878).
118
119

Id. at 680. (Strong, J., dissenting).
Id. at 671 (Miller, J., concurring) (Justice Miller agreed with Strong on the

general principle that if the public welfare requires that a company's property be
destroyed, the community ought to pay for it by condemning the property but he
ultimately agreed with Swayne that the power of the legislature to abate a
nuisance could only be limited by express terms of the contract).
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The Court also continued to apply the principle that a
legislature could not barter away the essential powers of
sovereignty, such as the police power. In Beer Company v.
Massachusetts, a corporation that had received a charter to
manufacture beer claimed that a subsequent state prohibition law
violated the contract clause. Writing for the majority in Beer
Company v. Massachusetts, Bradley reasoned that Beer
Company's possession of a charter could not be construed as
exempting the corporation to legitimate controls to which an
individual citizen would be subject. 120 The right of both the
corporation and individual were held subject to the police power of
the states. While Bradley did not attempt to define the police
power he noted that protecting the lives, health, and property of
citizens and preservation of good order and public morals "...
belong emphatically to that class of objects which demand the
application of the maxim, saluspopuli
suprema lex (the welfare of
12 1
law).'
supreme
the
is
the people
It was not until after four new justices joined the Court in
the early 1880s that attorneys for the corporate and business elite
increased their efforts. They achieved some measure of success in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,which came to
stand for the proposition that corporations are persons for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 122 Even then, however, they failed
to obtain the kind of constitutional protections from government
regulation that their clients wanted.
The Court continued to refuse to equate regulation with
confiscation. It refused to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as
providing a general restriction on government regulation of
business. In cases challenging the validity of regulations it
continued to rely on the antebellum legal tradition that emphasized
120 Beer Co., 97 U.S. at 32.
121 Id.; Stone v. Mississippi 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (applying similar reasoning to a
state law prohibiting lotteries).
122 Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). There is considerable
controversy about the means by which this precedent was established. See, C.
PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: A TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER

(1963).
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the right of the community as a limit on property. The ideas and
theories that corporation and business attorneys pressed were
gradually becoming part of constitutional discourse, but their
elevation to constitutional doctrine would have to wait until after
the Waite era.
After Chief Justice Waite died and was replaced by
Melville W. Fuller in 1888, the Court subtly revised Munn's
presumption of the validity of state legislation in the Minnesota
Milk Rate Case of 1890.123 Writing for the majority, Justice
Samuel Blatchford said: "the question of the reasonableness of a
rate charged for transportation by a railroad company is eminently
a question for judicial investigation."' 12 4 Then, inthe 1898 case
Smyth v. Ames, it added force to the idea that regulation was a form
of confiscation when it ruled that the due process clause
guaranteed that businesses receive a fair return on the value of the
property it employs for the public convenience. 125 At the same
time the Court began to hone a theory called "liberty of contract"
that subjected all regulation, not just ratemaking, to the challenge
that it violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth
126
Amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The modem narrative of constitutional history tends to treat
Munn as a steppingstone in the evolution of laissez-faire
constitutionalism. But analyzing Munn in its own context puts a
different spin on the majority decision. It demonstrates that the
Munn majority, while concerned about the American constitutional
123 Chi., Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).

124 Id. at 454. This statement led Justice Bradley to complain that the majority's
decision "practically overrules Munn v. Illinois." Id.at 461 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); See, James W. Ely, Jr., The RailroadQuestion Revisited: Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota and the ConstitutionalLimits on
State Regulations, 12 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY 121-34 (1992).
125 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
126 See, JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,

1888-1910 83-110 (1995).
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tradition relating to liberty, was even more influenced by another
constitutional tradition that runs equally deep. It was a tradition
that emphasized popular sovereignty and that placed property
rights in the context of balancing individual freedom and the needs
of a democratically governed society. From this perspective Munn,
instead of being a steppingstone for development of a doctrine that
emphasized economic liberty, might better be described as a last
gasp for the antebellum legal tradition that emphasized rights of
the community as a limit on property.
Last gasp may be something of an exaggeration, however.
From the perspective of long-term history, it is true that the
Supreme Court eventually did move away from Waite's reasoning
and rejected the constitutional tradition based on popular
sovereignty for a doctrine that idealized an absolutist right of
property. Instead of balancing property right against right of the
community it used a model of individual right versus government
power, and it narrowly defined the reach of that power. But the
demise of the Court's respect for the rights of the community was
more of a drawn out sigh than a sudden gasp

